Pressure tools

According to RIA, China 's rapid development of naval capabilities is clearly causing concern in the US. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy has long surpassed the US Navy in the number of warships and submarines (370 compared to 295).

Furthermore, China is significantly ahead of the US in the pace of warship construction: 157 compared to 67 from 2014 to 2023. In addition, the PLA Navy is much younger than the US Navy, with 70% of its ships launched after 2010, compared to only 25% for the US Navy.

The U.S. is particularly concerned about the increasing aircraft carrier capabilities of the Chinese Navy. In their report, "Reversing the Situation," experts from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) at the Pentagon argue that the PLA Navy is becoming a potential tool for military pressure in the Western Pacific.

The report's authors emphasize that aircraft carriers are far more important than simply being a means of transporting aircraft taking off from the carrier. This is because they are the centerpiece of a carrier strike group, coordinating escort ships, submarine forces, reconnaissance, and attack assets.

Such a group has the capability to project power, conduct operations far from its base, and threaten enemy sea lanes. For China, this means the ability to gradually expand its presence beyond its coastal waters.

This issue also has a political aspect. The U.S. believes that building such ships is linked to China's ambition to consolidate its position as a leading naval power.

China has long prepared to counter U.S. aircraft carriers by developing its submarine fleet, ballistic and cruise anti-ship missiles, and reconnaissance and targeting systems.

CSIS suggests that the U.S. should use a combination of capabilities to counter Chinese ships: covert surveillance, long-range weapons, dispersed forces, and attacks on command and control systems.

Ambush

CSIS analysts believe that submarine forces are the primary means of countering Chinese aircraft carriers.

This primarily refers to multi-purpose nuclear submarines capable of secretly monitoring carrier groups and attacking them with torpedoes or missiles. These would be supplemented by diesel-electric submarines from allies such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea .

This situation makes perfect sense: The U.S. currently has a clear advantage over China in terms of submarine fleet quality and combat experience. The goal of this strategy is not necessarily to immediately destroy an aircraft carrier.

Equally important is creating constant instability: Chinese command must assume that enemy submarines may be nearby in any deployment area.

This forced them to invest more resources in escort ships, anti-submarine aircraft, sonar systems, and route security.

However, this has a drawback: A dense "ambush belt" against multiple Chinese carrier groups would require a significant number of submarines.

The increased use of unmanned underwater vehicles and the deployment of naval drones at allied bases have been suggested as part of the solution.

Another factor is the land-based anti-ship missiles deployed on islands and allied bases from Japan to the Philippines .

The highly accurate PrSM and Typhon missile systems are capable of monitoring straits and access routes to the Philippine Sea, creating areas where large naval forces would have to operate at greater risk.

The air component includes anti-ship missiles launched from aircraft, receiving target data from satellites and other reconnaissance systems. Among the assets mentioned by CSIS are the LRASM, SM-6, and Naval Strike Missiles.

The American concept holds that success does not depend on a single "superweapon," but rather on the integration of missiles, reconnaissance, communications, air power, and naval forces into a unified attack network.

The report places particular emphasis on electronic warfare and cyber warfare, which disrupt data exchange, command and control systems, and targeted data transmissions within opposing groups of nations.

Unmanned surface vehicles are also crucial: According to the report's authors, they threaten ports, anchorages, and ships at bases.

New structure

To implement this strategy, CSIS proposed revising the fleet structure. Instead of the previous plan of 350 manned ships and 150 unmanned surface and underwater systems, the fleet would now consist of 300 manned ships and 300 unmanned ships.

This reflects the changing nature of naval warfare. Large ships are still very important, but they are too expensive and are easy targets to detect.

Drones, autonomous sensors, and mobile missile launchers allow for the dispersal of forces, hindering enemy targeting and achieving results without sacrificing any high-value vessels.

The U.S. also relies on industrial cooperation with allies in the Indo -Pacific region. Otherwise, the U.S. would not be able to sustain a prolonged campaign.

Joint production of precision-guided munitions, naval drones, and the establishment of stockpiles in the region are considered integral parts of this strategy.

The core idea is to reverse the roles. Instead of viewing U.S. aircraft carriers as vulnerable targets for the PLA's missile and submarine forces, the U.S. wants to turn Chinese aircraft carriers into a source of risk for China itself.

This strategy does not mean that the Americans consider them easy targets. On the contrary, it requires large stockpiles of precision-guided weapons, intelligence development, an expanded submarine fleet, strengthened alliances, and solutions to shipbuilding problems.

Source: https://giaoducthoidai.vn/chien-thuat-moi-cua-my-chong-trung-quoc-post794798.html